Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 1

Note

1979

Analysis of the FTC Line of Business and Corporate Patterns
Reports Litigation
Douglas P. Whipple

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Note, Analysis of the FTC Line of Business and Corporate Patterns Reports Litigation, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev.
83 (1979)

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

NOTES
ANALYSIS OF THE FTC LINE OF BUSINESS
AND CORPORATE PATTERNS REPORTS LITIGATION
I.
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the Federal Trade Commission
NDER THE AUSPICES OF THE INFORMATION-GATHERING AUTHORITY

Act,' the Commission has developed two corporate report programs entitled

"The Line of Business [LB] Report Program" and "The Corporate Patterns
Report [CPR] Program." These broad-based statistical surveys solicit from
domestic corporations information on financial performance, value of
shipments, net manufacturing activities, and significant acquisitions and
disposals.2 According to one observer: "The purpose of both programs was to

give the Commission an adequate data bank on market structures3 for use in
antitrust enforcement, economic analysis, and policy planning."

The LB and CPR survey orders were issued to hundreds of corporations,
mostly giant conglomerates. 4 Predictably, the corporations resisted the report
requirements. Such resistance was not necessarily indicative of any improper

or illegal business practices on the part of the corporations. In each case there
existed potential objections to the burdens which these report programs
IThe Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FTCA],
grants to the FTC, in addition to specific authority to prevent and prosecute violations of the Act,
the following information-gathering authority:
(a) To gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate from time to
time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of any corporation
engaged in commerce, excepting banks and common carriers subject to the Act to
regulate commerce, and its relation to other corporations and to individuals,
associations, and partnerships.
(b) To require, by general or special orders, corporations engaged in commerce,
excepting banks and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, or any
class of them, or any of them, respectively, to file with the Commission in such form as
the Commission may prescribe annual or special, or both annual and special, reports or
answers in writing to specific questions, furnishing to the Commission such information
as it may require as to the organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and
relation to other corporations, partnerships, and individuals of the respective
corporations filing such reports or answers in writing. Such reports and answers shall be
made under oath, or otherwise, as the Commission may prescribe, unless additional
time be granted in any case by the Commission.
FTCA § 6(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(a)-46(b) (1976).
2 In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, In re FTC Corporate Patterns Report
Litigation, 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as LB/CPR Litigation]. For a concise
yet informative description of the LB and CPR programs, see id. at 690-93.
347 U.S.L.W. 2031 (July 18, 1978).
E.g., from the oil industry: Ashland, Atlantic Richfield, Gulf, Mobil, and Texaco; from the
steel industry: Bethlehem and Republic; from the automotive industry: Chrysler, Ford, and
General Motors; and from the rubber industry: Dunlop, Firestone, General, and Goodyear.
"[T]he Commission at one time contemplated receipt of LB Reports from 500 large
manufacturing corporations representing 70% of the manufacturing capacity of the United
States. . . . [O]ne can infer the percentage of manufacturing capacity of the proposed reporting
companies is significant." A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 396 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 n.1 (D. Del. 1975),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976).
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would impose. For example, these federal reports, by their nature, incur costs
with no subsequent contribution to corporate revenues. Also, there were
legitimate questions as to whether the information requested was relevant and

useful to the FTC's formulated purpose. Indeed, there were legitimate
questions as to what in fact was the FTC's purpose, if any. There were
potential objections to the FTC's attempt to acquire and possibly to publish

information purported to be "trade secrets" or otherwise confidential. Finally,
there were demands that the corporations be granted greater opportunity in

both the administrative and the adjudicative processes to present these
objections for serious consideration.
The inevitable result of this dispute over the LB and CPR programs has
been a myriad of pre-enforcement claims, enforcement claims, and
counterclaims, between several administrative agencies and hundreds of
corporations, and in numerous federal courts. This horde of litigation is

summarily styled In re FTC5 Line of Business Litigation;In re FTC Corporate
Patterns Report Litigation.
The formal dispute came to a virtual end with the recent denial of
certiorariby the United States Supreme Court.6 The corporations had no
remaining alternative but to comply with the report orders. Nonetheless the
issue remains controversial as to how far and in what fashion the FTC may
burden corporations in the enforcement of its statutory mission. This article

analyzes the competing interests and examines some mutually beneficial
alternatives.
II.

BACKGROUND

The seeds of this controversy were planted in 1970, when the FTC began
developing a Line of Business survey, designed to gather from domestic
manufacturing corporations aggregate performance statistics in terms of a
uniform set of market categories. Such statistics were meant to enable the
Commission "to identify areas of the economy in which profits are relatively
high or low and to assess relationships between market structure and
performance, and to use this information to target particular markets for
industry-wide investigations into potential antitrust violations or unfair trade
7
practices ."

After lengthy consideration and extensive revision, a limited Line of
Business report form was served on 345 companies for the collection of 1973
data. 8 "Numerous motions to quash the 1973 orders were denied by the
5 432 F.Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1977), afl'd, 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 362
(1978). See also related litigation: FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976); FTC v. Anderson, 442 F. Supp. 1118
(D.D.C. 1977); In re FTC Corporate Patterns Report Litigation, In re FTC Line of Business
Report Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 72,420 (D.D.C. 1977); In re FTC Corporate Patterns Report
Litigation, In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 72,141 (D.D.C. 1977);
FTC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 71,489 (D.D.C. 1977); In re FTC Corporate
Patterns Report Litigation, In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 432 F. Supp. 274
(D.D.C. 1977); A.O. Smith v. FTC, 417 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Del. 1976); A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC,
396 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Del. 1975); Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 390 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); A.0. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Del. 1975).
1 99 S. Ct. 362 (1978).
7595 F.2d at 691.
8 Id. at 690 n.3, 691.
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Commission. Pre-enforcement actions [by the corporations] seeking to enjoin

the 1973 survey were commenced in the District Courts of Delaware and the
Southern District of New York."9 The corporations alleged, interalia,a failure
of the FTC to promulgate the LB orders in accordance with the procedures
for rulemaking prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 10 The
corporations charged that the FTC failed to publish notice of proposed
rulemaking and failed to invite, receive, or consider comments from the
public. Since the FTC did not characterize the LB orders as "rules" subject to
the rulemaking formalities of the APA, it did not attempt to deny these
allegations in the pre-enforcement litigation.'

In August 1975, the FTC issued a more intricate LB form to
approximately 450 corporations for the collection of similar data for the year
1974. Motions to quash these 1974 LB orders were filed by 180 companies, and

2
similarly denied by the Commission.1
In addition to the Line of Business Report Program, the FTC began

developing a Corporate Patterns Report Program in 1972. The CPR survey
required the corporations "to report the value of shipments from their
domestic manufacturing establishments . . . in terms of product

classifications developed by the Census Bureau for use in the Quinquennial
Census of Manufactures . . . [and] data regarding, inter alia, consolidated

net manufacturing activities and major acquisitions and disposals."' 13 In July
1975, the Commission served CPR orders on 1,100 corporations for 1972 data.
Faced with 390 motions to quash, the Commission denied
the motions, yet
4
made some modification of the reporting requirements.1

The FTC commenced enforcement proceedings in the District Court of
the District of Columbia against the companies which refused to comply with

the 1974 LB and 1972 CPR orders. The district court consolidated these
enforcement proceedings with the 1973 pre-enforcement proceedings. The
district court upheld the FTC and denied every critical corporate claim."5
Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
9 Id. at 690 n.3 (citing A.O. Smith v. FTC, 417 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Del. 1976); Aluminum Co.
of America v. FTC, 390 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 396 F. Supp.
1108 (D. Del. 1975), afl'd in part and vacated in part, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir.1976); A.O. Smith
Corp. v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Del. 1975) ).
10A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515,519 (3d Cir. 1976); Administrative Procedure Act §
4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) [hereinafter cited as APA].
" A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 396 F. Supp. 1108,1122 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976). See also note 45 infra and accompanying text. In litigation
subsequent to the pre-enforcement actions, the FTC argued hypothetically and alternatively that
if the LB orders constituted rulemaking, the FTC adequately followed APA rulemaking
procedures.
12 595 F.2d at 692. "Orders requiring reports for the 1975-76 Line of Business Survey have
been served on 481 companies but the FTC has not instituted enforcement proceedings.," Id. at
691 n.3.
13 Id. at 692.
14 Id. at 693.
1 LB/CPR Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 72,420 (D.D.C.), 1977-2 Trade Cas. 72,141 (D.D.C.),
432 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C.), 432 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C. 1977). The earliest of these four opinions is
one disposing of various motions for summary judgment, the second and third are the substantive
opinions, and the most recent is an order denying a corporate motion to amend the final order and
judgment.
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unanimously affirmed the decisions rendered by the district court. 16 The
Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. 7

III.

ANALYSIS

The most noteworthy aspect of this litigation is the existence of several
conflicting policies, each supported by express Congressional enactment.

There is a conflict between the FTC's broad information-gathering authority
and the confidentiality Of information acquired by the Census Bureau under
the Census Act.' 8 Likewise, conflict exists between the FTC's broad
information-gathering authority and the Comptioller General's scrutinization

of administrative information-gathering programs, required by the Federal

Reports Act. 19 Finally, there is a conflict between the FTC's informationgathering authority and the administrative procedural limitations imposed by

the APA as well as the Constitution.20 The challenge is to determine how to
reconcile these conflicting policies appropriately, if at all.
A. Census Act
A conflict exists between the respective information-gathering authorities

of the FTC and the Bureau of the Census. Congress granted to the FTC broad
power to gather information in order to facilitate the formidable task of
preventing unfair competition and deceptive trade practices. 2' Congress also
granted to the Census Bureau broad power to gather information. In order to

minimize resistance by companies and individuals, and to enable the Census
Bureau to gather this information in an uninhibited fashion, Congress
provided in section 9(a) of the Census Act that information so furnished

would be confidential and immune from acquisition or use by other
government agencies. 22 In order to underscore the legislative intent that

9(a) in
census information should be immune, Congress amended section
23
1962 to provide that copies of census reports were also immune.

16 LB/CPR Litigation, 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978) [since this court of appeals decision
was the judicial climax of the litigation, all references hereinafter to "the court of appeals" are to
this court and this opinion].
1799 S.Ct. 362 (1978).
18See notes 21-67 infra and accompanying text.
"I See notes 68-96 infra and accompanying text.
20 See notes 97-163 infra and accompanying text.
21FTCA § 6(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(a)-46(b) (1976), set out atnote 1 supra. The extraordinary
breadth of the FTC's information-gathering authority is illustrated comparatively with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Power Commission in 595 F.2d 694
n.46.

22Section 9(a) of the Census Act provides:
(a) Neither the Secretary, nor any other officer or employee of the Department of
Commerce or bureau or agency thereof, may . . .
(1) use the information furnished under the provisions of this title for any
purpose other than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied; or
(2) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any particular
establishment or individual under this title can be identified; or
(3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the
Department or bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports.
13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1976).
23The 1962 amendment reads as follows:
No department, bureau, agency, officer, or employee of the Government, except the
Secretary in carrying out the purposes of this title, shall require, for any reason, copies of
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The Director of the Bureau of the Census stated that the purpose of the
immunity was to create goodwill and cooperation on the part of respondents
to Census Bureau inquiries, in turn resulting in greater accuracy, com24
pleteness, and promptness of response.

Conflict arises when the FTC desires information which is already in the
hands of the Census Bureau. It is obvious that the actualdocuments in the files
of the Census Bureau are beyond the scope of inquiry of the FTC.2 5 However,
it is also indisputable that, merely because the Census Bureau has asked a
question and received an answer, such particle of information is not totally
and permanently blotted from the subsequent purview of all other
government agencies. 26 The task is to
determine where between these two
27

extremes to delineate the immunity.

census reports which have been retained by any such establishment or individual.
Copies of census reports which have been so retained shall be immune from legal
process, and shall not, without the consent of the individual or establishment concerned,
be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any action, suit, or judicial or
administrative proceeding.
Pub. L. No. 87-813, 76 Stat. 922 (1962).
24 Affidavit of Manuel D. Plotkin, Director of the Bureau of the Census, Department of
Commerce, reprintedin Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 78-168 (Brief for Petitioner Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., et
al.) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.]:
Even in mandatory programs, the accuracy and completeness of census data are
dependent upon the goodwill and cooperation of respondents. The Census Bureau has
developed a high degree of such cooperation because respondents are confident that
information supplied the Census Bureau will be handled on a confidential basis and will
be used solely for statistical purposes. . . . If . . . companies were requested to file
such data with the FTC, many firms might decline to submit information based on
estimates (as they have in the past) for fear that such data would be used for other than
statistical purposes. Rather, firms might restrict their reporting to data that can be
substantiated from back records, an alternative that is legally permissible. The result
would be the submission of less reliable and useful statistical data the the Census Bureau.
Id. Addendum B at 3b-5b. See also 42 Op. A-rr'y GEN. 151 (1962) (confidentiality provisions apply
to "voluntary" replies to the Census Bureau); 595 F.2d at 700 & nn.81-83 (confidentiality avoids
unnecessary, time-consuming clearance procedures and verifications).
25 FTC v. Orton, 175 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Census Bureau immunity upheld as against
FTC subpoena); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 21 F.R.D. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (Census
Bureau immunity upheld as against discovery procedure).
13 U.S.C. § 8 (1976) provides certain exceptions to Census Bureau immunity not relevant here.
See note 131 infra.
26 Two governmental agencies have stressed this point in Congressional legislative hearings
regarding the 1962 expansion of Census Bureau immunity. The Bureau of the Budget (the
predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget) stated: "[C]are must be taken not to extend
[Census Bureau] confidentiality to such an extent as to interfere unduly with responsibilities of
other agencies of Government in carrying out functions which require information. These include
antitrust acts and other regulatory acts." H.R. REP. No. 2437, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962). The
Commerce Department stated:
[T]he ability of a regulatory agency to formulate inquiries, even one identical with those
asked by Census, would not be affected. The only restriction would be that the inquiry
would not demand an answer by definition identical with that furnished the Census
Bureau in another context and for another purpose.
Id. at 7; S. REP. No. 2218, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1962), reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3188, 3191. See also Hearings on Confidentiality of Census Reports Before the House
Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 27 (1962).
27 An item which is of more value in identifying the conflict than in resolving it is § 132 of the
Census Act, providing that "nothing in this title shall be deemed to revoke or impair the authority
of any other Federal agency with respect to the collection or release of information." 13 U.S.C. §
132 (1976). Since the confidentiality provision was undoubtedly intended to have some force, an
application must occur in each case, as opposed to the automatic deference to the agency implied
by § 132.
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Historically, the FTC has been aggressive in testing the limits of the
Census Bureau immunity provision. The CPR litigation is but the most recent

link in the chain of FTC attempts to acquire Census data by various means.28
For example, in FTC v. Orton,29 the FTC subpoenaed from a corporation the

information which the corporation had submitted to the Census Bureau in
furtherance of an antitrust investigation against that corporation. The district

court made the following significant observation:
It is to be noted that the subpoena duces tecum does not require the
respondent to submit any work papers or other material used by the
respondent in compiling the information submitted to the Bureau of

the Census, or file copies thereof, but schedules submitted to the
Bureau, together with all correspondence clarifying or amending
30
said schedules or reports.
The court reasoned that demanding copies of actual schedules was tanta-

mount to demanding the original, confidential schedules. As such, the court
enforced the immunity provision and rejected the FTC subpoena.
In the related case of FTC v. Dilger,3' again pursuant to an antitrust
investigation, the FTC subpoenaed file copies of information submitted by
the corporation to the Census Bureau. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals enforced the immunity provision and rejected the FTC subpoena.
Soon a conflict between the circuits developed. In United States v. St.
Regis PaperCo.,32 another antitrust investigation, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals enforced the FTC's subpoena of file copies of Census Bureau
schedules retained by the corporation. The court expressly disagreed with the

contrary holding of the Seventh Circuit in Dilger. The court analogized the
Census Bureau immunity to the tax return immunity under section 6103 of the
34
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 3 which permits the subpoenaing of copies.
In light of this conflict between the Second and Seventh Circuits, the
Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari of the St. Regis corporate
petitioner.3 5 In its opinion, the Supreme Court accepted the reasoning of the
28 See, e.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 285 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960), afi'd,368 U.S. 208
(1961); FTC v. Dilger, 276 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960); United States v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 210 F. Supp. 889 (D.N.J. 1962); FTC v. Orton, 175 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
21 175 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Borden Co.).
30 Id. at 78.
31 276 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960) (Beatrice Foods Co.).
32285 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
33 Section 6103 (a) provides:
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this
title-(1) no officer or employee of the United States,
(2) no officer or employee of any State or of any local child support enforcement
agency who has or had access to returns or return information under this section, and
(3) no other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to returns
or return information. . . , shall disclose any return or return information obtained by
him in any mranner in connection with his service as an officer or an employee or
otherwise or under the provisions of this section.
I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1976).
34 285 F.2d at 614 (citing United States v. O'Mara, 122 F. Supp. 399 (D.D.C. 1954) ).
35 St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 215 & n.4 (1961).
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Second Circuit and adopted the narrow view that the Census Bureau
immunity did not extend to copies retained by the corporate respondent.
In response to the St. Regis decision, and at the request of the Commerce
Department,36 the bureaucratic parent of the Census Bureau, Congress
37
legislatively overruled St. Regis in the 1962 amendment to the Census Act,
expressly providing that the section 9(a) immunity did extend to retained
copies of Census Bureau reports."8
In the Corporate Patterns Report litigation, the undaunted FTC once
again sought information which was arguably in the hands of the Census
Bureau exclusively. The corporate parties raised the section 9(a) immunity
provision to thwart this request. To be precise, the dispute arose not because
the FTC expressly sought to attain the actual Census information, but because
it sought information for its own purposes, utilizing questions, definitions,
classifications, and overall data-analysis methods identical to those used by
the Census. The corporate parties concluded that by utilizing so identical a
method, the FTC sought "to attain indirectly what it could not attain
directly,"3 9 to wit, information identical to that in the hands of the Census

Bureau.
The disputed data-collection method found its source in neither agency
but rather was developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Termed the "Standard Industrial Classification System" (SIC), this method
classifies products and product classes into two, three, and four-digit
categories:
The SIC system is designed to permit classification of establishments; to facilitate collection and presentation of data; and to
"promot[e] uniformity and comparability in the presentation of
statistical data collected by various agencies in the United States
Government, State agencies, trade associations, and private research
organizations. "40
In 1967, the Census Bureau extended the SIC into five-digit "product class
codes" and seven-digit "product codes," designed to measure manufacturing
31S. REP. No. 2218, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3188.
31 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
38 Despite this legislative reprimand, the Supreme Court denied a motion by the corporation
to recall and amend or correct the judgment, 369 U.S. 809 (1962), which included penalties of
$100 per day for several months during the course of the dispute. See 368 U.S. 227 (Black, J.,
dissenting). However, the 1962 amendment was passed just in time to be dispositive of another
attempt by the FTC to obtain retained file copies of Census reports in furtherance of an antitrust
action. United States v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 210 F. Supp. 889 (D.N.J. 1962).
31 LB/CPR Litigation, 432 F. Supp. at 306. Reportedly the Bureau of the Census joined the
corporations in opposing the CPR survey, describing it as "a subterfuge to obtain access to data
determined by the Congress to be confidential and not reachable by subpoena." On Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, No.
78-167, Reply Brief for Petitioners (American Air Filter Co., Inc., et al.) [hereinafter cited as
Reply Brief for Petitioners] at 4 n.1 (quoting Vincent Barabba, Director of the Bureau of the
Census, Department of Commerce).
40On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Brief for the
FTC, Appellees, Nos. 77-1732, 77-1930, 77-1943, & 77-1952 [hereinafter cited as Brief for the
FTC] at 25 (quoting Office of Management and Budget, Standard Industrial Classification
Manual: 1972 at 9 (1972)). See also 595 F.2d at 697 n.61.
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activity as well as quantity of shipments - this measure being termed "value
of shipments." 41 This extended SIC system was designed for use in the
Quinquennial Census of Manufactures.42
Rather than utilizing the OMB's SIC system, which was designed for

general use, or developing its own product classification system, the FTC
adopted the extended Census Bureau "value of shipments" survey. The rationale for this adoption was simple - the FTC planned to compare the
individual 1972 shipments data with aggregate data published by the Census
Bureau in the 1972 Census of Manufactures. 43 The court of appeals noted:
"FTC proposes to use the CPR survey data to create a data bank on market
structures for use by the Commission in antitrust enforcement, economic

analysis and policy planning." 44 In other words, this data could ultimately be
used to assist the FTC in its rulemaking, judicial, and public-information

functions. 45 Although the court of appeals tangentially rationalized that 4the
6
FTC inquiry differed from the Census Bureau inquiry in several respects, it

is important to note that the FTC data were relevant and useful only to the4

extent that they were comparable to the Census Bureau's aggregate data. 1
In order to reach its result in favor of the FTC and against immunity, the

court analyzed, in a fragmentary fashion, the wording of the Census Act and
its 1962 amendment, rather than sensing the overall intent of the statute. The
court's analysis would have been improved if it had expressly considered the
policies advanced by the competing statutes, with specific analysis of the
particular facts of the dispute in light of such policies. Upon doing so the court
could have sustained the broad policies which underlie both the Census Act

and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
There is a semantic ambiguity in the 1962 amendment to section 9(a) of the
Census Act which the FTC sought to exploit. The ambiguous portion
provides that no agency outside of the Census
shall require, for any reason, copies of census reports, which have
been retained by any such establishment or individual. Copies of

census reports which have been so retainedshall be immune from
41595 F.2d at 697 n.60; Brief for the FTC, supra note 40, at 25.
42 595
13

F.2d at 692.

Id. at 692, 697; 432 F. Supp. at 304.

44595 F.2d at 692. "In antitrust cases, SIC and Census industry and product class definitions
are frequently used in establishing the relevant market." Brief for the FTC, supra note 40, at
28 & n.35 (citing In re Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1, 23, 70 (1975), modified and aff'd, 540
F.2d 303, 308-09, 311 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Crown Zellerback Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769, 782-83, 792
(1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800, 804-05, 811 (9th Cir. 1961); A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d
585, 604-05 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 72,017 (E.D.
Pa. 1976); United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 66,665
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
45The corporate parties raised this precise point to argue that the potential use of this data in
rulemaking required the FTC to collect the data only after formal rulemaking hearings required
by § 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §553 (1976). 595 F.2d at 93-96. For a more thorough analysis, see the
district court's opinion at 432 F. Supp. 302-04. Both district and appeals courts rejected the rulemaking argument. The particular analysis of that issue is beyond the scope of this note.
3
46 595 F.2d at 697-98 n.6 .
47Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 39, at 3: "[T]he FTC clearly hopes and expects to
obtain the same answers to its value-of-shipments question as the companies furnished to the
Census Bureau. Any other result would be inconsistent with the FTC's professed desire to collect
individual company data compatible with the Census Bureau's published aggregate data."
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legal process, and shall not . . .be admitted as evidence or used

for any purpose in any action, suit, or other judicial or administrative
48
proceeding.
In dispute is the scope of the phrase "copies which have been retained."
The FTC argued that the immunity extended only to the actual document in
the file of the Census Bureau respondent. The court of appeals accepted this
interpretation. The court reasoned that "copies" plainly and unambiguously
meant "actual file copies."49
While it is undeniable that the FTC interpretation of the term "copies" has
appeal, to say that the term is unambiguous is an oversimplification. In terms
of the meaning of "copy," there is no difference between compelling the
production of a confidential document and compelling a separate report
containing responses identical to the information on the confidential
document. In either situation, the information which Congress sought to
immunize will have been "copied." To contrive a distinction between the two
situations would be absurd.5 0 The FTC implicitly conceded that the latter
situation, like the former, would violate the section 9(a) immunity, when the
FTC argued:
The companies seize upon the [Secretary of Commerce's] statement
that an agency could "not demand an answer by definition identical
with that furnished the Census Bureau," . . . a question requiring

that the company specifically reveal as such the actualanswer it gave
to a Census question . .. such as'" 'What information did you give
5
to the Census Bureau.' " . . . This the CPR form does not do.

Without necessarily accepting the FTC's exculpatory conclusion, it is
logical that the term "copy" would include not only the actual file document
but also the actual information which that document imparts. Otherwise, a
subsequent agency process could compel manual copying of that information
onto another non-confidential report.
The apparent conflict disappears once the overall Congressional intent is
reconsidered. The critical impact of the 1962 amendment, as it supplements
section 9(a), goes not to the issue of "copies" but to the issue of "immunity."
Responses to Census Bureau inquiries were to be immune, unless voluntarily
given. 52 The facts must be analyzed to determine whether the substance of

section 9(a) has been violated.
Among the facts indicating a contravention of the section 9(a) immunity
were that: a) the CPR was a compulsory report; b) the CPR questions,
classifications, and definitions were identical, or virtually identical, to those of
4 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
'9 595 F.2d at 698 & n.66.
5 See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 39, at 3-4: "To require a company to surrender its
file copies of census reports to the FTC is inconsistent with that kind of confidentiality. To require
a company to provide to the FTC the same numbers that appear on those file copies is equally
inconsistent."
5' Brief for the FTC, supra note 40, at 44-45 n.59 (FTC's emphasis). See the Secretary of
Commerce's statement set out at note 26 supra.
51Section 9(a) permits voluntary waiver of its immunity by the respondent to the Census
Bureau inquiry. Many corporations in fact did voluntarily provide their census data to the FTC.
See text accompanying note 54 infra.
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the Census Bureau inquiry; c) the information sought was " 'statistical
information specifically prepared for and submitted to the Census Bureau'
that was 'not prepared or maintained in the ordinary course of business;' "5 d)
the FTC desired to have data comparable to that collected and aggregated by
the Census Bureau; and e) the FTC
observe[d] in a footnote in its statement denying motions to quash in response to complaints concerning the burdensomeness of the
Commission's use of the revised product categories - that some
companies had found it convenient to refer to file copies of their 1973
Census reports, which showed the data filed by a company for 1972
54
restated by Census in accordance with the revised 1972 categories.
The implication of this footnote was that the FTC was suggesting, if not
artfully demanding, answers identical with those filed with the Census
Bureau.
Among the facts indicating no contravention of the section 9(a) immunity
were that: a) while the CPR was a compulsory report, there was no
compulsion to copy Census Bureau answers onto the CPR answers; b) the
CPR and Census questions were merely similar rather than identical; 55 and c)
any "misinterpretation" that may have been inferred as to the intent of the
FTC in its suggestion that companies use their Census Bureau report to
56
prepare their CPR was "clarified" in a subsequent FTC statement.
The finder of fact in this litigation, the district court, made no express
analysis of these facts in its opinion. There should have been specific findings
to indicate what effect the above items of evidence had on the corporate
respondents. A detailed analysis of this aggregate of facts might have revealed
an effect prohibited by the section 9(a) immunity provision. Rather than
making findings to determine whether the FTC in fact had attempted to
compel the production of actual confidential information, the district court
summarily granted to itself the authority to "balance" the competing interests
and thereby capriciously tilted the balance in favor of the FTC, notwithstanding the reality of these facts. 57 The reality is that the FTC wanted
information which Congress had determined should be immune. Rather than
offsetting one policy against the other, it was the duty of the court to seek to
reconcile and uphold the FTC's information-gathering authority and the
Census Bureau's immunity.
There is one element of the court of appeal's reasoning regarding Census
Bureau immunity that is assuredly incorrect, albeit ever so subtly. The analysis
53 595 F.2d at 697 n.58.
51 Brief for the FTC, supra note 40, at 31 n.39.
55 595 F.2d at 697-98 n.63. Some modifications had in fact been made by the FTC in response
to complaints by the corporations of undue burden. Id. at 693.
56 Brief for the FTC, supra note 40, at 31 n.39.
57 In the court's own words:

Thus the court must balance the corporate parties' expectation of confidentiality with
the FTC's legitimate information-gathering needs and cannot give maximum potential
expression to policy considerations of confidentiality. Any confidentiality privilege
granted by section 9, therefore, is but a qualified privilege that must be weighed in
conjunction with the FTC's right to collect relevant data.
432 F. Supp. at 306.
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of this error begins with the premise to which all parties and courts have
agreed, to wit, that to compel a respondent to provide on the CPR the
identical answer on the Census Bureau report contravenes the section 9(a)
immunity. 58 The court of appeals was careful to distinguish the situation
where the agency might compel an identical answer from the situation where
the agency merely asks an identical question without requiring an identical
answer.5 9 The court attributed the FTC's CPR survey to be of the latter,
lawful situation. In support of this conclusion, the court noted that although
the corporation may provide the exact Census Bureau data to the FTC, there
is no express compulsion to do so. The court apparently accepted the
conclusion of the FTC that
[t]he fact that the answers given to Census and the Commission
might differ as a result of the good faith use of better or more
complete records, differences in the instructions or certifications, or
voluntary application of higher standards of care would not create
any risk of criminal liability, for 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970) applies only
to one who "knowingly and wilfully" makes a "fictitious or
fraudulent" statement to an agency. 60
There are two distinct messages in this statement. The first message is that
confidential information is safe because identical answers are not required.
This assertion, as previously noted, is not completely true. The hidden
message, the significance of which was ignored by the court, is that if the
confidential Census Bureau data are not supplied, the answers supplied in lieu
thereof must be "better." Thus, the section 9(a) immunity is afforded only
conditional respect. The condition is that the information supplied to the FTC
may only differ from the confidential Census Bureau information if it has been
made more accurate as a result of better or more complete records, a higher
standard of care, or a more stringent degree of certification.61 To view it from
another angle, if the confidential Census data is unchanged in light of the 18
U.S.C. section 1001 requirements, then the FTC quite simply will have
compelled its disclosure, notwithstanding the section 9(a) immunity protection.
In its brief, the FTC scoffed at such a possibility:
Suffice it to say that, while some companies asserted that file copies
of Census reports were the most convenient source in which the
value of shipments data are readily available, no company
See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
" 595 F.2d at 700. See also 432 F. Supp. at 306.
'0 Brief for the FTC, supra note 40, at 33 n.42. See also 595 F.2d at 700-01, repeating the substance of this statement.
"1While Census Bureau inquiries merely require substantial accuracy and encourage the use
of estimates and approximations in the name of expediency and efficiency, 595 F.2d at 700, "the
CPR form requires a certification of accuracy and permits the use of estimates only where the
underlying data is unavailable." Id. at 698 n.63. Some corporations "have indicated that the unreviewed answers to the census inquiry are not sufficiently reliable for the certification of truthfulness required of their answers to the Federal Trade Commission." Id. at 700-01. In such an
instance, it would be erroneous for the respondent to submit the census data on its CPR response.
See text accompanying notes 54, 56 supra.
18
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established that it simply could not complete
the CPR report without
62
referring to file copies of Census reports.
The FTC nevertheless conceded that such a situation might constitute a
violation of the section 9(a) immunity:
In the unlikely event that a company had no records other than a file
copy of a Census report from which it could reasonably estimate the
value of shipments data called for by the CPR report a different
question might be presented if the Commission attempted to require
the company to refer to the file copy as a basis for the information
called for by the CPR report.63
In short, subtle factual variations could result in a violation of section 9(a)
immunity. Yet the courts failed to make particularized findings of fact despite
the deliberate similarity of the CPR inquiry to the Census Bureau inquiry.
While aware that the CPR inquiry requires an element of relevance, 64 the
court ignored the significance of the fact that the relevance of this data is
dependent upon its comparability to otherwise confidential data.6 5
Calculations of burdensomeness and cost of compliance were indefensibly
premised on the assumption that CPR respondents would waive their section
9(a) immunity, 66 while offering the CPR respondents the Hobson's choice of
incurring additional costs to recompute the answers from underlying records
with no assurance that such recomputation would necessarily result in data
dissimilar from that in the hands of the Census Bureau. 67 With this realization,
it is not nearly as clear as the court of appeals concluded that on these facts
there was no breach of the section 9(a) confidentiality.
A conclusive overview is appropriate. The FTC has made the policy
determination that it will utilize the revised SIC system as a tool in its fair trade
and antitrust functions. The FTC has fortified its disregard of the competing
confidentiality policy considerations with a highly technical, contrived
statutory interpretation. In persuading the courts to embrace this nuance, the
FTC has successfully chiseled another stone from the wall of Census Bureau
immunity.
B.

FederalReports Act

Another set of conflicting Congressional policies involves the FTC's
information-gathering authority and the coordination of federal reporting
programs in the Federal Reports Act (FRA). 68 Essentially, the FRA creates a
clearinghouse for any project designed by a federal agency which requires
information from a business enterprise. Before adopting or revising
62

Brief for the FTC, supra note 40, at 30 n.38.

63

Id.

64 For discussion of the standard of relevance imposed by the APA, see notes 133-63 infra and

accompanying text.
65 See note 47 supra.
66For discussion of the measure of cost of compliance, see notes 108-20 infra and
accompanying text.
67 See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
68 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3512 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as FRA].
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information-gathering plans or forms, the agency must submit them to the
clearinghouse for examination and comparison with the informationgathering activities of other agencies. The policy of the FRA is to minimize

both the burden upon businesses in furnishing information to federal agencies
and the cost to federal agencies in collecting this information. It is the task of
the clearinghouse to eliminate unnecessary duplication of efforts in obtaining
information and to require the collection and tabulation of information in a
manner so as to maximize the usefulness of the information to other federal
agencies and the public.6 9 To the extent that this clearinghouse is empowered
to pass substantive or procedural judgment upon an agency project and to
modify, limit, or prohibit all or part of an agency project in furtherance of the
goals of the FRA, there is an imposition visited upon the otherwise legitimate
70
information-gathering activities of the respective agency.
When developing the 1974 LB program, the FTC submitted the LB
surveys to the clearinghouse authority, that is, to the Comptroller General of

the United States, in the Government Accounting Office (GAO). After
soliciting comments from interested persons, the Comptroller approved the
1974 LB form, specifically finding, according to the court of appeals, "that the
information sought was not available to the FTC from another federal source
and that the commission had sufficiently minimized the respondents' burden
of compliance with the reporting requirement."' In a footnote the court
further explained that "[tihe Comptroller's . . .letter indicated that

revisions in the LB form for 1973 had improved, in the Comptroller's view, the
meaningfulness of the data to be collected. The Comptroller expressly
indicated, however, that his views were advisory and not within the standards
of review provided by [the FRA] ."72
The Comptroller's letter also contained a potentially significant reservation. According to the district court: "The . . .letter noted, interalia, that the
FTC had made 'constructive efforts' to minimize burden, and that 'a rather
09For application of the FRA to independent federal regulatory agencies, see 44 U.S.C. §3512
(Supp. V 1975), set out at text accompanying note 84 infra. For application of the FRA to federal
non-regulatory agencies, see § 3501:
Information needed by Federal agencies shall be obtained with a minimum burden
upon business enterprises, especially small business enterprises, and other persons
required to furnish the information, and at a minimum cost to the Government.
Unnecessary duplication of efforts in obtaining information through the use of reports,
questionnaires, and other methods shall be eliminated as rapidly as practicable.
Information collected and tabulated by a Federal agency shall, as far as is expedient, be
tabulated in a manner to maximize the usefulness of the information to other Federal
agencies and the public.
44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
No study of the FRA is complete without the following ironic observation of the Commission
on Federal Paperwork:
There is little doubt that this Act, designed to eliminate duplicative Federal reporting
requirements, has been largely ineffective. . . . Contentions have also been made that,
because of the unduly restrictive provisions of § 3508(b) [between sharing agencies,
both sets of penalties for unlawful disclosure apply in full], the Act may actually
discourage, rather than encourage, the interagency exchange of data.
Commission on Federal Paperwork, Confidentiality and Privacy 45 (July 29, 1977).
70 In the case of the FTC, this information-gathering authority is granted by the FTCA § 6(a)(b), 15 U.S.C. H9 46(a)-46(b) (1976), set out at note 1 supra.
71 595 F.2d at 709.
71Id. at n.147.
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long test period of data collection and analysis will be required to fully
reconcile FTC's data needs with minimum burden.' ,13
The Comptroller's reservation reveals the fact that in his review of surveys

submitted to him under the FRA, the Comptroller does not "engage in a wideranging, substantive inquiry into the proposed forms' appropriateness. "' 74 The
corporations contended that the term "appropriateness" is used here to mean
that the inquiries are suitable for the intended purpose - that they meet

" 'some minimum standard of meaningfulness and reliability in terms of the
agency's stated need.' ,-75
The corporations objected to the Comptroller's approval of the LB
survey. 76 They suggested that the Comptroller should have made the wideranging substantive inquiry into "appropriateness" which the Comptroller

conceded that he failed to make. They also said that, under FRA section 3512,
the Comptroller should not have approved the LB form until after making a

gather information that is useful and
determination that the form would
77

reliable for the FTC's stated need.
The court of appeals determined that the corporations' argument was "at

odds with both the language and the legislative history of section 3512 of the
Federal Reports Act. ''78 In its opinion, however, the court failed to elaborate
on the language of the statute. Nonetheless, a more meticulous examination of
both the language and the statute's legislative history illustrates that the court's
conclusion was correct.

As originally promulgated in 1968 and codified in Chapter 35 of the United
States Code, the FRA coordination policy applied to independent federal
regulatory agencies in the same manner as it- applied to all other federal
73432 F. Supp. at 311.
74Id. at 308 & n.37 (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 24346 (1974) ). In this Federal Register citation,

Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats stated: "The basic subject of GAO reviews is not what
information an agency needs or should collect, but rather whether particular plans or report
forms are appropriate for collecting such information."
75595 F.2d at 709.
71Interestingly, the FRA dispute involved only the LB, not the CPR, program. It was no
accident that while the corporate parties opposed the Comptroller's authorization of both the LB
and the CPR programs at the trial level, they dropped their CPR objections on appeal. The
corporate parties had been claiming, on one hand, that the Comptroller should have disapproved
the CPR program on the basis that the program would duplicate the Census Reports and, on the
other hand, that this same Census data was confidential and not available to the FTC. See notes
21-67 supra and accompanying text. While procedurally there is nothing wrong with alternative
pleading in federal courts, FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (e) (2), in the final analysis, the corporations cannot
have it both ways. Either the corporations must consent to disclosure of the data to the FTC, or
they must concede that the data is necessarilyunavailableto the FTC, taking the data out of the
"unnecessary duplication" scope of the FRA. They obviously chose the latter option.
77 In its brief to the Supreme Court, one of the corporate parties phrased the issue thus:
Whether under the provisions of the Federal Reports Act, that an "independent
regulatory agency shall make the final determination as to the necessity" of obtaining
information, and that the Comptroller General "shall determine" the "appropriateness"
of a proposed agency questionnaire, the Comptroller General can approve a form if he
has not determined it will gather information that is meaningful and reliable for the
agency's stated need.
Brief for Petitioner Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 24, at 2-3 (quoting from 44 U.S.C. §
3512(d) (Supp. V 1975), set out at text accompanying note 84 infra).
7s595 F.2d at 709.
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agencies. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget 9 was
charged with implementing this coordination, and the OMB was designated
as the clearinghouse for agency plans and forms for the acquisition of
information. 80 The court of appeals observed that: "[T]he OMB possessed
authority to undertake a substantive appraisal of the data that a regulatory
agency sought and to bar collection upon a finding that the data were not
necessary for effectuation of the agency's function or particular program's

purpose."8' In 1973, Congress amended the FRA by removing the
independent regulatory agencies from the overview of the OMB, and a new
section 3512 placed the agencies under the overview of the Comptroller
General.8 2 The court of appeals cited persuasive legislative history to support

the proposition that one of the purposes of the 1973 amendment was the intent
to reserve to the regulatory agencies the final decision as to the substantive
from the clearinghouse
necessity of the information sought and to remove
83
agent any "veto power" on the basis of necessity.

Although the language of the new section 3512 is somewhat ambiguous,
a detailed examination of the section reveals the same result as was suggested by the legislative history.

Section 3512 reads as follows:
(a)

The Comptroller General . . . shall review the collection

of information required by independent Federal regulatory
agencies . . . to assure that information required by such agencies
7' The original 1968 statute, Pub. L. 90-620, 82 S fat. 1302 (1968), refers to the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget rather than to the Director of OMB. Later, the Bureau of the Budget was
designated as the Office of Management and Budget. See Part I of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of
1970, set out at the appendix to 5 U.S.C., Government Organization and Employees (1976) at824.

8044 U.S.C. §§ 3503, 3504, 3506, 3509, 3510 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
81595 F.2d at 710 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
Section 3506 provides:
Upon the request of a party having a substantial interest, or upon his own motion, the
Director of the [Office of Management and Budget] may determine whether or not the
collection of information by a Federal agency is necessary for the proper performance
of the functions of the agency or for any other proper purpose. Before making a
determination, he may give the agency and other interested persons an opportunity to
be heard or to submit statements in writing. To the extent, if any, that the Director
determines the collection of information by the agency is unnecessary, for any reason,
the agency may not engage in the collection of the information.
44 U.S.C. § 3506 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
82 Pub. L. 93-153,87 Stat. 593 (1973). The removal was implemented by §409(a), and the new
authority was established by § 409(b), which added the new section, 44 U.S.C. § 3512.
83 595 F.2d at 710. The court stated:
Congress' express purpose in establishing a different review process for the regulatory
agencies was "to insure that the existing clearance procedure for questionnaires or
requests for data does not become, inadvertently or otherwise, a device for delaying or
obstructing the investigations and data collection necessary to carry out the important
regulatory functions assigned to the independent agencies by the Congress."
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-624, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1973)). "Congress regarded the
evaluation of the regulatory agency's need for data as essentially a policy determination and
considered the reviewing agency's veto power as a source of interference with the independence
of the regulatory agencies." Id. (citing Senator Bentsen, author of the enacted amendment, 119
CONe. REC. 24085 (1973); 119 CONG. REC. 23884-85 (1973)).
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is obtained with a minimum burden upon business enterprises. .

.

. Unnecessary

duplication

of efforts

. . .

shall be

eliminated as rapidly as practicable. Information collected and
tabulated by an independent regulatory agency shall, as far as is
expedient, be tabulated in a manner to maximize the usefulness of
the information to other Federal agencies and the public.
(b)

[T]he Comptroller General shall review . . . requests for

additional information with a view toward (1)

avoiding duplication of effort . . . and

(2) minimizing the compliance burden ...
(c) [A]n independent regulatory agency shall not conduct . . . the collection of information . . . unless, in advance of

any adoption or revision of any plans or forms to be used in the
collection -

(1) the agency submitted to the Comptroller General the
plans or forms . . . and

(2) the Comptroller has advised that the information is not
presently available to the independent agency from another source
within the Federal Government and has determined that the
proposed plans or forms are consistent with the provision of this
section ...
(d) While the Comptroller General shall determine the
availability from other Federal sources of the information sought
and the appropriateness of the forms for the collection of such
information, the independent regulatory agency shall make the final
determination as to the necessity of the information in carrying out
its statutory responsibilities and whether to collect such informa4
tion.8

The FTC interpreted section 3512 to require that the Comptroller's review
was to be guided by two standards, section 3512(b) (1) (avoiding duplication
of effort) and section 3512(b) (2) (minimizing compliance burden). The
corporate parties bypassed these two clearly delineated standards and
latched onto the word "appropriateness" buried in a dependent adverbial
clause in subsection (d): "[T]he Comptroller General shall determine . . .
the appropriateness of the forms for the collection of such information." The
corporate parties argued that in order for the Comptroller General to
determine "appropriateness" of the forms, he must eliminate from the forms
repetitive, irrelevant, and excessively complicated questions. He must
eliminate questions which, in pursuit of data on apples, require data on
oranges, or which, in seeking data about butchers, require responses from
bakers.8 5 In short, they argue, the Comptroller has a duty to make a pervasive
substantive inquiry into the meaningfulness and the reliability of the agency's
stated need.
In rejecting the corporate parties' argument, the court of appeals
summarily adopted the district court's finding that "appropriateness" was a
8444

U.S.C. § 3512 (Supp. V 1975).

85 Brief for Petitioner Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 24, at 27 n.27.
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mere "shorthand reference to the . . . compliance burden." ' While this

conclusion seems inevitable from a fair reading of the act as a whole, a
semantic analysis makes the meaning even less disputable.
A clear pattern emerges from section 3512. That pattern is that each
subsection contains one pair of related concepts, comparable to the pair of
concepts in each subsequent subsection. Subsection (a) (goals) refers to the
assurance of minimum burden and the elimination of unnecessary duplication. Subsection (b) (standards) refers to avoiding duplication of effort and to
minimizing the compliance burden. Subsection (c) (2) (duties) refers to
advice by the Comptroller General to agencies of "availability" of
information from other federal sources and of "consistency" of the proposal
"with the provision of this section." Undoubtedly "availability" is the initial
shorthand reference to the overall duplication problem. "Consistency"
appears to be a shorthand reference to the overall burden problem. The entire
theme of the section is burden. What phrase could convey this theme more
clearly than "consistent with the provision of this section"? Subsection (d)
again utilizes a pair of terms to refer to the same problems. "Availability" is
another shorthand reference to the duplication problem, and "appropriateness," like "consistency," is another shorthand reference to the
overall burden problem. Again the compelling consideration indicating this
meaning is that it would have been grammatically difficult to convey the
burden concept other than by use of the word "appropriateness." Having
identified this clear and consistent dual-problem pattern, the correctness of
the court's interpretation of section 3512(d) becomes evident.
The district court deserves credit for noting that the word "appropriateness" is merely one word in a subsection which, rather than granting
substantive authority to the Comptroller, as the corporate parties suggest,
accomplishes the opposite by merely qualifying "the reservation of the
determination of necessity to the agency. ' 87 The corporate parties'
interpretation that the dependent clause gives authority to the Comptroller
conflicts with the plain meaning of the independent clause reserving the same
determination to the agency. 8
In this aspect of the litigation the corporations did not dispute the authority
of the FTC to determine that certain line-of-business data were necessary.
They merely argued that the questions on the LB survey were inadequate to
give the FTC the meaningful and reliable data that it undoubtedly sought.
The corporations argued that requiring them to submit meaningless and
unreliable information was the kind of "burden" that the Comptroller had the
authority and the duty to prohibit.89
86 595 F.2d at 710 (citing the district court opinion, 432 F. Supp. at 307-10).

1 432 F. Supp. at 308; see 44 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (1970 & Supp. V. 1975), set out at text
accompanying note 84 supra.
88 As the court of appeals put it:
Appellants' construction of "appropriateness" as a requirement that the Comptroller
evaluate the data sought in terms of the agency's need is untenable in light of this
provision reserving for the agency the determination as to the necessity of the
information in carrying out its statutory responsibilities. Statutes must be construed
when possible to avoid disharmony among their provisions.
595 F.2d at 710 & n.156.
9 Brief for Petitioner Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 24, at 28.
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This argument is based on the untenable premise that the requested data
were in fact meaningless and unreliable. The aforementioned reservation in
the Comptroller's letter of approval indicated that he had in fact made some
inquiry into meaningfulness. 90 Apparently, his conclusion was that, while he
might impose a higher standard of "appropriateness" at some later date, the
FTC had done what it could during the formative stages of the LB program to
make the questions as meaningful and reliable as possible. This reservation
indicates that rather than failing to exercise his mandated discretion, as the
corporations alleged, the Comptroller did exercise it, albeit tentatively, in
favor of the FTC.
In terms of the implementation of the FRA, it should be noted that the
Comptroller's approval is not technically mandatory. Having submitted the
proposed survey to the Comptroller for approval, and having received no
response within forty-five days, the individual regulatory agency may
immediately proceed to obtain its information.9' Unlike the OMB which, in
the case of non-regulatory agencies, may totally prohibit a plan for collection
of information, 92 the Comptroller has no such prohibition authority. His
function is advisory. 93 It follows that the substantive determination of
necessity remains vested in the agency.
Another related practical consideration was identified by the Delaware
district court in A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC.94 As this case was an early contribution to the collection of LB/CPR litigation, the facts as well as the issues
are substantially identical to the primary case. In concluding that the Comptroller's review embraced only a limited examination of burdensomeness and
duplication, the court observed: "Indeed, the period of 'time in which the
GAO must consider a proposal and report back - 45 days - would nearly

obviate any extended evaluation of a proposed reporting program." 95
In the limited time available, and with the limited information available
regarding the reliability of data not previously aggregated or analyzed, the
Comptroller in giving a reserved approval preserved his opportunity to
further minimize burden at a later date when such minimization would be
appropriate. While the statute does not expressly provide for a temporary,
90 See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
9144 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (Supp. V 1975): "If no advice is received from the Comptroller General
within forty-five days, the independent regulatory agency may immediately proceed to obtain
such information."
92FRA § 3506: "To the extent, if any, that the Director determines the collection of
information by the agency is unnecessary, for any reason, the agency may not engage in the
collection of the information." 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See also FRA § 3509:
A Federal agency may not conduct or sponsor the collection of information ...
unless, in advance of adoption or revision of any plans or forms to be used
in the collection, (1) the agency has submitted to the Director the plans or
forms, . . . and (2) the Director has stated that he does not disapprove the proposed
collection of information.

id. § 3509.
'3Whether,

as the district court queried, "advice" was intended either in the sense of
communication and notice or in the sense of a recommendation and opinion has no substantial
effect on the non-mandatory nature of the Comptroller's review authority. See 432 F. Supp. at
307-08.
94 396 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd in partand vacatedin parton other grounds, 530 F.2d
515 (3d Cir. 1976).
95 396 F. Supp. at 1132.
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reserved approval by the Comptroller, the spirit of the law is preserved,
rather than compromised, by the Comptroller's recognition that what is

minimally burdensome presently might not be so at a later date.
These practical considerations supplement the language and legislative
history and compel the conclusion that the Comptroller has no duty under the
FRA to conduct a plenary inquiry into the usefulness and reliability of
requested information to the agency's stated need, nor to withhold his
approval pending such determination. The notion that such a duty to inquire
should be levied upon the agency itself will be examined in a subsequent
96
section.
C. Burden Analysis
Among the most significant of competing interests illuminated by the

LB/CPR litigation is the inevitable conflict between the federal regulatory
agency's need to acquire information in order to perform effectively its
statutory function97 and the corporation's need to be able to function in a
competitive, free-market system unhampered by the various burdens
inherent in any government intervention. The potential burdens on the

corporation are numerous and awesome. 9 One example is the burden of the
expense of manpower and other resources utilized in gathering, preparing,
and submitting information to government agencies.9 9 An important element

of this expense is the cost of special accounting and legal services needed to
properly verify, certify, and possibly defend the reports submitted as meeting
the particular reporting standard imposed by the respective agency.100 There

is also a fear on the part of corporate respondents that trade secrets might find
their way into the hands of competitors, notwithstanding statutory provisions
to prevent such disclosure. 0 1 In addition, there is a concern that other
91 See notes 133-63 infra and accompanying text.
97 For the FTC's information-gathering authority, see FTCA § 6(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(a)46(b) (1976), set out at note 1 supra.
98 For example, as FTC Commissioner Elizabeth H. Dole has noted, the 60,000-plus pages of
regulations set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations result in a cost to regulatees of $45 billion
a year. Dole, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus Protectingthe Vulnerable: The FTC's SpecialInterest
Groups, 9 ANiirrusr L. & EcoN. REv. (No. 2) 15, 17 (1977). The Commission on Federal
Paperwork sets the cost of federal paperwork to private industry at a more conservative yet still
formidable figure of $25 to 32 billion a year. Commission on Federal Paperwork, Final Summary
Report 5 (Oct. 3, 1977).
'9 See discussion of cost of compliance estimates at notes 108-20 infra and accompanying text.
See also discussion of the unquantifiable psychological burden resulting from federal information
requirements, Commission on Federal Paperwork, Information Value/Burden Assessment 4-6
(Sept. 9, 1977).
100For example, reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission must meet the standard
known as "generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)." On the other hand, Census Bureau
reporting discourages stringent accounting formalities and encourages "estimates and
approximations." See note 61 supra. The FTC reporting standard was somewhere in between.
The district court found that the GAAP standard was too high. "[D]ata of such quality were not
required by the Commission and . . . were more expensive to compile than data not meeting
such high standards. . . . [T]he LB instructions in no way refer to GAAP." LB/CPR Litigation,
1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,151 (D.D.C. 1977). The court of appeals found that the Census Bureau
standard was too low. "[Tjhe unreviewed answers to the census inquiry are not sufficiently
reliable for the certification of truthfulness required of their answers to the Federal Trade
Commission." 595 F.2d at 700-01.
10 See, e.g., FTCA § 6(f), 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976), set out at text accompanying note 122 infra.
See also APA § 2(b) (4), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1976): "[The Freedom of Information Act] does not
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confidential information, which is not suitable for purposes other than the
purpose for which it was submitted, will be misused by the agency to the
injury of the corporation, despite statutory provisions to prevent such
misuse. 10 2 Just as there is the possibility that information will inappropriately
be shared among government agencies,a 3 there is also a possibility that
information that could and should be shared among agencies will not be,
resulting in the additional burden to the corporation of having to report in an
uncoordinated and disintegrated manner information which could have been
0 4
compiled in a coordinated fashion at a fraction of the cost and effort.1
Furthermore, as within the agency itself, it goes without saying that the
respective agency can simultaneously conduct legislative, administrative, and

judicial "functions." While there are stringent procedural safeguards
regarding the acquisition of information in the "legislative" and "judicial"
forums, there may be no realistic way to assure the corporation that
information already acquired by the agency via its information-gathering

authority will not be filtered into concurrent, otherwise segregated,
"legislative" and "judicial" proceedings, to the prejudice of the corporation. 0 5
Even more important is the burdensome possibility that corporations will be

required to provide information to the agency for nothing more than a
capricious purpose, 10 or, assuming a valid purpose, to provide information
that is not meaningful or useful to the stated purpose. 10 7
The salient questions are: a) upon whose shoulders the responsibility for
assessing and minimizing these burdens should rest, and b) by what means

these burden assessments can be realistically and effectively implemented.
1. Cost of Compliance
While it is indisputable that there are corporate costs attached to the

submission of the LB and CPR forms to the FTC, the amounts of such costs
are subject to significant dispute. The dollar value of such costs were so
apply to matters that are . . . trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential."
102 See, e.g., Census Bureau confidentiality provisions, 13 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1976), set out at note
131 infra and notes 22-23 supra. See also St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208,215-16
(1961), where neither a Presidential proclamation nor a legend on the Census Bureau forms was
sufficient to prevent disclosure of the disputed information.
103 For example, the efforts of the FTC to acquire confidential Census Bureau information. See
notes 28-38 supra and accompanying text.
101See discussion on Federal Reports Act at notes 68-96 supra and accompanying text.
105This very issue was the topic of the LB/CPR litigation reported in FTC v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 567 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Therein, the dispute was remanded to the FTC so that it "could
provide an interpretation of its procedural rule pertaining to the transfer of documents obtained
by the FTC investigative staff for use in an adjudicative proceeding." Id. at 96. See also 595 F.2d
at 707, where certain appellants who were also respondents in separate FTC adjudicative proceedings argued that the LB and CPR orders ought not be enforced as to them because the FTC
"complaint counsel might obtain the LB and CPR data for use in the adjudications without complying with the Commission's discovery procedures, thereby violating appellants' rights under
the due process clause, the Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's own rules of
practice." The court dismissed these arguments as premature.
106APA § 10(e) (2) (A), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (A) (1976): "[The court reviewing agency action
shall] hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
107 See discussion on relevance at notes 133-63 infra and accompanying text.
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uncertain at the time of the principal LB/CPR district court opinion that the

district court deferred decision on that issue until additional affidavits could
be submitted in order to provide the factual foundation for a supplemental
decision. 108
The additional affidavits indicated that for large, diversified corporations
submitting reports containing accurate, high quality data, the estimated cost
of compliance was easily in the six-figure bracket. 10 9 While the district court

discounted the estimates as inflated on the basis that the corporations had
failed to reduce their costs by taking advantage of legally permissible
estimates and lower accounting standards, the presumably conservative
estimates of the GAO did not preclude the possibility of a six-figure cost." 0
The GAO average estimate ($24,000) and expected estimates ($10,000 to

$75,000) coincided with numerous other corporate estimates ($10,000 to
$100,000) to suggest, almost indisputably, that the cost of compliance would
run into the tens of thousands of dollars for each corporation."'
The district court pointed out that the absolute value of the estimated cost
of compliance is irrelevant unless the corporation "has demonstrated that the
cost of compliance threatens to unduly or seriously hinder normal operations

of its business."'

2 To

satisfy itself as to the absence of business disruption, the

court examined the estimated costs of compliance relative to the corporations'
gross revenues. Upon calculating the estimated costs to a few corporations to

be approximately one hundredth of one percent of gross sales, the court
concluded that the costs of these programs were de minimus and, therefore,
3
not unduly burdensome."
Without suggesting here that the corporations in fact made a conclusive

showing of undue burden, the manner in which the agency and the courts
calculated cost estimates should be scrutinized.

The dispute regarding the confidentiality of Census Bureau data has
already been explored.

14

One contention raised by the corporations, but

108 Notwithstanding the judiciousness of basing a decision on a solid factual foundation, Judge
Flannery exposed his "prejudicial" attitude in the earlier district court decision. As to the LB
program he stated: "Since the LB orders are directed at many of the largest companies in this
country . . . the corporate parties face an uphill battle showing that compliance 'threatens to
unduly disrupt or seriously hinder normal operations of a business.' "As to the CPR program he
stated: "While the court again considers it unlikely, on the basis of evidence presently in the
record, that the corporate parties will be able to make a sufficient showing of undue burden, it will
permit them the opportunity to do so .. " 432 F. Supp. at 315-16 (emphasis added). Not
surprisingly, the corporate parties were thoroughly unsuccessful in persuading the court on these
issues.
109LB/CPR Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 72,141, 72,149. For a detailed cost analysis, see
generally id. at 72,147-53.
110Id. at 72,152.
' Id.
12 Id. at 72,151. See also 432 F. Supp. at 315 (quoting FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862,882
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) as the source of this "disruption" test).
13 Specifically, the court stated:
[E]ven for the companies presenting some of the most extravagant cost estimates the
amount involved is relatively small. For example, DuPont's upper estimate of $700,000
amounts to 0.0084% of its 1976 sales of $8,361,000,000, while Grace's estimate of $630,000
amounts to 0.017% of its 1976 sales of $3,615,153,000, and Goodyear's estimate of
$150,000 amounts to 0.0028% of its 1974 sales of $5,300,000,000.
1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,151-52 (citations omitted).
114 See notes 21-67 supra and accompanying text.
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unanswered by the courts, is that "FTC estimates of cost of compliance are

based on the use of Census Bureau data."' 15 Presumably the implications of
this contention were rendered moot by the court's determination that the
information, as requested, was not confidential. 1 6 Nevertheless, where the
corporation has a claim of right to the confidentiality of certain information,
the inquiring agency has no right to assume that the corporation will

voluntarily waive its confidentiality privilege. It follows that the agency has no
justifiable reason to calculate a lower cost of compliance based on the
assumption that the corporation will voluntarily release otherwise confidential information. It is only appropriate for the agency to calculate cost
estimates based on the assumption that the corporation will take advantage of
every right and privilege to which it is legally entitled.
Moreover, it is sensible for the court to examine the extent of disruption
caused by a particular program on a corporation's on-going operations. What
is lacking, however, is an examination of the disruption to corporate

operations which results from the aggregate federal reporting requirements.
While the few thousands of dollars required to complete the LB and CPR
programs might not, in and of themselves, significantly impair the functioning

of the corporation, these programs might be the back-breaking straw when
added to the multitude of other corporate reporting programs." 7 With an

awareness of the sizeable bite which taxes and other government-induced
burdens take out of corporate revenues, it is meaningless, if not ludicrous, to
compare this additional cost alone to gross sales.
The result is that, as noted by the Commission on Federal Paperwork:
"[T]he cost is ultimately imposed on the consumer through higher prices and

higher taxes.""' Ironically, the increase of costs of consumer goods results in
increased corporate revenues, which in turn are used by agencies and courts
to rationalize the proportionate government-imposed cost burden.
Of course, courts are in no position to make any aggregate cost-burden
analysis. The court has no jurisdiction to inquire into programs unrelated to

the dispute before it." 9 Conversely, there seems to be no forum where the
corporation has standing to raise such an issue. Ideally there should be some
administrative process by which government programs could be examined
115

432 F. Supp. at 316.

116 595 F.2d at 698.

See the conclusion of the Commission on Federal Paperwork:
The total paperwork burden is important because even one series of justifiable requests
for information can result in an excessive economic and psychological burden. This can
occur when multiple Federal agencies and layers of government each impose reporting
requirements on the same respondent. In such cases, the individual burdens of Federal
forms from a particular agency need to be considered in the context of the greater
cumulative burden and the ability of the respondent to meet those reporting
requirements.
Commission on Federal Paperwork, Information Value/Burden Assessment 6 (Sept. 9, 1977).
us Commission on Federal Paperwork, Final Summary Report 1 (Oct. 3, 1977).
117

nl See the notable constitutional law case, United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947): "As is well known, the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution
do not render advisory opinions. For adjudication of Constitutional issues, 'concrete legal issues,
presented in actual cases, not abstractions' are requisite." Id. at 89 (Reed, J.) (citing, inter alia,
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423 (1940); Electric Bond & Share
Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 443 (1938)).
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for their comparative merit, so that the overall burden could be diminished by
the elimination of relatively unbeneficial agency impositions. The concept of
20
systematic value-cost assessment will be examined in a subsequent section.
2.

Trade Secrets

Some of the corporate parties asserted that the CPR program was invalid
because one of the FTC's purposes for the program was an intent to publish
such data. The corporations argued that such information as "costs, sales,
assets, value of shipments, and inter-corporate relationships" constituted
trade secrets within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act
section 6(f). 121 Section 6(f) provides:
The Commission shall .. .have the power to make public from
time to time such portions of the information obtained by it
hereunder, except trade secrets and names of customers, as it shall
deem expedient in the public interest; and to make annual and
special reports to the Congress and to submit therewith recommendations for additional legislation; and to provide for the publication
of its reports and decisions in such form and
manner as may be best
22
adapted for public information and use.
The district court concluded that while section 6(f) prevents the FTC from
publishing trade secrets, there is no proscription against the FTC collecting
trade secrets for its own purposes. 2 3 Such a conclusion is sensible in light of
the purposes of the trade secrets protection. While the protection is designed
to keep from competitors the fruits of the honest labor of the disclosing
corporation, the protection should not be so broad as to keep from regulatory
agencies evidence of the unlawful acts of the corporation.
The district court failed to make its own determination as to whether the
requested information constituted trade secrets. Instead the court required
the submission of the information to the FTC, leaving to that agency this
threshold determination. 2 4 For additional procedural protection to the
corporate parties, however, the court enjoined the FTC from publishing any
individual corporation's data without ten days notice to the respective
1
corporation. 25
It is laudable that this extra measure of procedural safeguard was afforded
the corporations. Normatively speaking, where the government has the right
to collect information, that information should be submitted unconditionally.
Realistically speaking, however, if the government is careless in its handling
of sensitive information, responses to subsequent requests for information are
tainted by diminution of "integrity, completeness and timeliness."' 26 Thus,
120

See notes 133-63 infra and accompanying text.

121

432 F. Supp. at 311.

15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976) (emphasis added). See also APA § 2(b) (4), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (4)
(1976), set out at note 101 supra.
122

432 F. Supp. at 311.
Id. at 312 (citing FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc)
125 432 F. Supp. at 312.
123
124

).

126 Affidavit of Manuel D. Plotkin, Director of the Bureau of the Census, supra note 24,
Addendum B at 3b.
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both the corporations and the government stand to gain from a conservative
protection of purported trade secrets.

Unfortunately, this protection is not always steadfast. On occasion,
27
agency personnel are guilty of indiscreet disclosure of trade secrets.1
Congress, with its vast power to procure information from an administrative
28
agency,1
is uniquely capable of leaking confidential agency information to

the public, with little or no redress available to the injured party. 2 9 With the
passage of the Freedom of Information Act, agencies were probed by
ambitious competitors eager to acquire corporate trade secrets for their own
purposes.

30

Perhaps there is no practical way for any entity the size of modem
administrative agencies to prevent occasional inadvertent disclosure of trade

secrets. However, the agencies can, and should, be liberal in the granting of
notice and hearing on trade secret status to corporations prior to the

publication of submitted data. The agencies should be conservative in their
decisions to publish disputed data in a manner other than aggregate form

which would conceal individual respondent identity.

31

By the granting of

information freely to the agency, which by virtue of its statutory authority and
expertise is in the best position to effectively use the information for the public
good, and by the imposing of stringent safeguards on subsequent publication
of individual data, there is an automatic separation of the "wheat" of
127

See section on "The Commission's Incapacity to Assure Confidentiality" in E.

Rocx.FELLER, DESK BOOK OF FTC Pn.AcrICE AND PROCEDURE 61 (2d ed. 1976).
12s See generally Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation,40 Hnav. L. REv. 153 (1926).
12' Note, CongressionalTreatment of ConfidentialBusiness Information: Proposalsto Avert
UnwarrantedDisclosure,52 IN'. L.J. 769 (1977). This note analyzes Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409
F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C.), afj'd, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976), where a corporation unsuccessfully
attempted to prevent release of agency information to Congressman John E. Moss, notorious for
his leaking of confidential information to the public.
130See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1975).
131 Such a situation could be realized statutorily in much the same way as provided for in the
Census Act:
[T]he Secretary may furnish copies of tabulations and other statistical materials
which do not disclose the information reported by, or on behalf of, any particular
respondent ....
In no case shall information furnished under this section be used to the detriment of
any respondent or other person to whom such information relates, except in the
prosecution of alleged violations of this title.
13 U.S.C. § 8 (1976).
An interesting sideline to the LB/CPR litigation is that several high corporate officials met with
James McIntyre, Director of the OMB,requesting that the President use his authority under the
government reorganization law to remove the LB program from the auspices of the FTC and
transfer it to the Census Bureau. The purported rationale is to take advantage of the Census
Bureau's more effective privacy guarantees. While the Census Bureau favors such a transfer, the
FTC argued against it, suggesting that the type of information gathered by the Census would not
be useful to the FTC's needs. Wall StreetJournal, July 10,1978, at 3, col. 1; Automotive News, July
24, 1978, at 24, col. 4. While it is not implied here that the corporations entertained any motivation
to frustrate the FTC in the utilization of this data in antitrust enforcement, it does seem less than
logical for one agency to collect for a second agency data which the second agency has a need and
a right to collect for itself.
Assuming proper corporate motives, it would seem that their objections would be easily
resolved by the simple Congressional fortification of FTC privacy requirements suggested
above. This solution is to be encouraged, and would be much less complicated and difficult than
any extensive interagency transfer of the program.
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corporations with valid trade-secrets claims from the "chaff" of corporations
3
whose real intent is to delay and obstruct disclosure to the agency.
3.

Relevance and Burden

The fourth amendment to the Constitution prohibits "unreasonable

searches and seizures."1 33 This proscription applies to unreasonable impositions by government agencies. However, the concept of "unreasonableness" has varied over time.
In the early years of the FTC's existence, Justice Holmes warned against

administrative "fishing expeditions" conducted on no other basis than "the
possibility that they may disclose evidence of a crime."' 134 In his analysis
regarding a broad FTC subpoena served upon a corporation prior to the
issuance of a formal complaint, Justice Holmes went on to examine

considerations of both burden and relevance:
The interruption of business, the possible revelation of trade secrets,
and the expense that compliance with the Commission's wholesale

demand would cause are the least considerations. It is contrary to the
first principles of justice to allow a search through all the
respondents' records, relevant or irrelevant. . . . Some evidence of

the materiality of the papers demanded must be produced. 135
Over the years, however, subsequent Supreme Court decisons have
eroded the duty of the agency to justify the burden it imposes upon
corporations. 136 In one of these decisions, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling,'3 Justice Rutledge determined that corporations are not entitled to
the same constitutional guarantees as natural persons and that, as to corporate
reporting requirements, the fourth amendment search and seizure protections

applied only to the extent that the information requested had to be
132 Ironically, the FTC has been criticized for overprotecting corporations by withholding
information from the public. In a critical evaluation of the FTC, a group of students under the
auspices of consumer advocate Ralph Nader suggested, rather dogmatically, that the FTC should
abandon its so-called considerate, cooperative stance with the corporations and make full
coercive use of the enforcement authority at its disposal. E. Cox, R. FELLMErH, & J. ScI-rLZ, "THE
NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 111, 166 (1969). "[T]he FTC fails to perceive
and take advantage of the enforcement potential of its most extensive authority-the power to
require disclosure of information and publish it in the public interest." Id.
133 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also APA § 10(e) (2) (A), 5 U.S.C. 706(2) (A) (1976), set out at note 106
supra.
134 FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
35
1 Id.
'31See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943). Caveat, some courts may find subtle distinctions between a
fact situation involving actual search and seizure and a fact situation involving merely a corporate
report order. For a detailed analysis of the procedural significance of this distinction, particularly
as it applied to the LB/CPR litigation, see Jacobs, Collin, Summary Enforcement of FTC Orders
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,30 AD. L. REv. 331 (1978).
137 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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"particularly described." In expounding this restrictive interpretation, he
outlined the test by which to determine "reasonableness":
[T]he fair distillation [of prior cases], in so far as they apply merely
to the production of corporate records and papers in response to a
subpoena or order authorized by law and safeguarded by judicial
sanction, seems to be that . . . the Fourth [Amendment], if
applicable, at most guards against abuse only by way of too much
indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be "particularly
described," if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency is
authorized by law to make and the materials specified are
3
relevant. 1
Here, clearly, Justice Rutledge identified a three-pronged test: a) definiteness; b) legal authorization; and c) relevance. He went on to underscore the
subjective nature of each application of this test, particularly the relevancy
determination:
The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms,
that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable. . . . Necessarily, as has been said, this cannot be reduced to formula; for relevancy and adequacy or excess in the breadth of the subpoena are
matters variable in relation to the nature, purposes and scope of the
inquiry.

3 9

In the LB/CPR litigation, there was little dispute over the legal
authorization or definiteness aspects of the reporting requirements. 14 The
hotly disputed issue was relevance. The corporate parties identified several
areas where the nature of the requested LB data failed to coincide with the
stated agency need:
Identifying the Commission's purpose in the LB program as the
development of "good market performance data" for antitrust and
resource allocation purposes, the corporate parties suggest that the
LB data is entirely unsuited for these purposes because of four
deficiencies: (1) individual company LB data and published LB data
aggregates would be noncomparable; (2) the LB aggregates to be
published would not bear any reasonable relationship to economic
data; (3) the LB aggregates to be published would not bear any
reasonable relationship to market data; and (4) the LB aggregates to
be published would be unreliable because of contamination caused
by arbitrary and improper assignment to LB categories on a primary
141
activity basis.
138 Id. at 208 (emphasis added). Another significant holding of this case was that corporations
are not entitled to the fifth amendment self-incrimination rights of natural persons. Id.
139Id. at 208-09 (citing, inter alia, FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924)).
140 As the court of appeals noted:
During oral argument, counsel for appellants stated that the corporations were not
faulting with the power of the Commission to conduct the Line of Business and
Corporate Patterns Report surveys, but rather challenging only the alleged procedural
unfairness of the way in which the Commission has exercised its authority.
595 F.2d at 694 n.39 (emphasis added).
141

432 F. Supp. at 314-15.
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There were similar allegations that the CPR data
would be unsuitable "for
14 2
any purpose other than publishing aggregates."'
As evidence of the unresolved issues pertaining to the relevance of the
requested data to the stated need, the corporate parties pointed to
reservations made by the Comptroller in his approval of the 1974 LB form.
These reservations were summarized by the district court as follows: "The
GAO clearance letter noted, inter alia, that the FTC had made 'constructive
efforts' to minimize burden, and that 'a rather long test period of data
collection and analysis will be required to fully reconcile FTC's data needs
with minimum burden.' "143 How could it be said that the relevance test had
been met when such further testing and reconciliation remained to be made?
The corporate parties offered an interesting interpretation of the strictures
of cases such as Oklahoma Press. They suggested that the factors of burden
and relevance were interrelated and should have been examined in tandem
with each other.14 4 The corporations contended that since relevancy issues
remained in dispute, and cost-of-compliance issues remained in dispute, the
FTC had failed to perform its procedural duty. They stated:
Resolution of the issues requires, among other things, a careful
evaluation of how relevant the information demanded is to the
purposes articulated by the agency in support of its incursion into
private business records compared with the burden that the
incursion places on the business proprietors. No such balancing took
place with respect to the line of business program, despite the open
acknowledgement by the lower courts that (a) the burden of
compliance would run into hundreds of thousands of dollars
annually for some respondents, and (b) the information that would
be produced may or may not be useful in effectuating the kind of
educational regulatory endeavor which the line of business program
represents. 145
The courts refused to consider the interrelationships between burden and
relevance. 1 46 Instead, they purported to weigh these two considerations
separately. Whether any weighing took place at all is subject to question. The
deficiencies in the burden analysis have already been noted. 47 The courts' socalled relevancy analyses were typically passive and deferential to the FTC.
In its brief to the Supreme Court, one of the parties noted:
The most the District Court was able to conclude was that the
14
143

Id. at 315.
Id. at 311.

144 The corporations stated: "Both experience and precedent support the view that however
the ultimate test may be framed, whether as 'reasonable relevance' or as 'undue burden,' a
balancing of costs against benefits lies at the heart of the judiciary's role in protecting businessmen
and others against overly broad intrusions by Government." Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra
note 39, at 7 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); and FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298 (1924) ). While this conclusion is plausible, it is far from indisputable.
I45 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, No. 78-167, Brief for Petitioners (American Air Filter Co., Inc., et al.)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners] at 28 (citations omitted).
146432 F. Supp. at 314; 595 F.2d at 704.
147See notes 108-32 supra and accompanying text.
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information to be produced would not be "totally useless." It was
only on the basis of applying this far too lenient standard that the
District Court determined not to take and hear evidence on the issue
of relevance and to grant summary judgment for the Commis48
sion.1

To say that the court of appeals applied a standard of "reasonable relevance"
is an overstatement. In the words of the court itself: "We defer to the
Commission's expertise in concluding that this information is necessary and
useful to performance of its regulatory responsibilities.' 49
Scrutiny of relevancy and burdensomeness and the lack thereof should not
be taken so lightly.150 The unrestrained growth of government-imposed
burdens has reached critical proportions. The reality of this problem has been
substantiated by the creation in 1974 of the Commission on Federal
Paperwork, whereby Congress affirmed its policy to minimize the "unprecedented paperwork burden upon private citizens, recipients of Federal
assistance, businesses, governmental contractors, and State and local
governments,"
which is created by federal information reporting require51
ments.'
Among its reports, the Federal Paperwork Commission emphasized the
burdensomeness of data-collection programs such as the LB and CPR:
As a general rule, that information which supports the direct
operation of the program is the most valuable, that is, it is directly
related to achieving the program goal of citizen well-being.
Information for planning, auditing, research and evaluation has
lesser value, since it supports the program, and does not in itself lead
to an improvement in the general welfare ...
When information resources are heavily weighted in favor of
those activities that do not produce direct value for a program, it is
1 52
an indication of unnecessary burdens.
The LB and CPR programs are highly susceptible to this type of criticism
since they merely create data banks for general, embryonic purposes. 153 The
burden and relevancy tests should have been applied by the courts with much
less passivity and deference.
In pursuit of their contention that there should be substantive inquiry into
relevance as it relates to burden, the corporate parties also argued that there
148Brief for Petitioners, supra note 145, at 28 n.34 (citations omitted).
149595 F.2d at 703 n.103. The court curtly noted: "[A]ppellants have failed to persuade us

that the District [sic] Court erred in its refusal to disregard the long and consistent line of authority
supporting independent consideration of relevance and burdensomeness." Id. at 704.
150Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,217 n.57: "The issues of authority
to conduct the investigation, relevancy of the materials sought, and breadth of the demand are
neither minor nor ministerial matters."
151 Pub. L. 93-556, 88 Stat. 1789 (1974), §§ 1(a)-l(b).
152 Commission on Federal Paperwork, Information Value/Burden Assessment 33 (Sept. 9,
1977).
13 432 F. Supp. at 299: "[T]he LB and CPR programs are not focused investigations. . . . [T]he FTC admits that the LB and CPR programs are broad-based and not
aimed simply at suspected violators. . . . [Tlhese statistical reporting programs are more in the
nature of a fishing expedition."
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ought to be conducted prior to the imposition of the report programs, a costbenefit analysis as a measure of reasonableness. 5 4 Cost-benefit analysis is a
method of evaluating service activity in terms of measurable results. It
attempts to determine whether the expense of providing a service is more or
less than the value of the benefits derived from the service.
Cost-benefit analysis has been utilized in a limited fashion in some FTC
activities. 155 Such utilization has not been without opposition. FTC
Commissioner Elizabeth H. Dole, in an address before the American Council
on Consumer Interests, expressed her own reservations to cost-benefit
analysis. She stated: "[T]here is a very real danger that preoccupation with
dollar cost-benefit analysis, with its aura of quantitative precision and
economic specificity, can lead to the neglect of other goals and objectives that
are at times as critical to the FTC's mission as dollar economic benefits."' 156 She
went on to outline several ends which she believes are not sufficiently
quantifiable to be subject to measurement by cost-benefit analysis, such as
health and safety improvements, correction of quantitatively insignificant yet
flagrant violations of FTC regulations, and consumer information. Commissioner Dole's critics suggest that the FTC's mission is little more than
altering the overall imbalance of power between producers and consumersby taking from the rich and giving to the poor. "A good FTC case
is . . . nothing more nor less than a case that saves the poor a lot of dollars. A
bad FTC case, by the same token, is simply one that saves them a smaller
number of dollars."5 7 If this latter view be accepted, then the results of FTC
activities are easily quantified and subject to cost-benefit analysis. In reality,
however, this view is an oversimplification. The FTC's function is more than
merely "taxing" producers and "transferring" dollars to consumers. Its
purpose is not to inject "equality" into the free-market system, but
"fairness." 58
Generally, cost-benefit analysis is viewed in terms of cost to the taxpayers,
i.e., cost to the government. In the LB/CPR litigation, the corporate parties
put an interesting twist on cost-benefit analysis. They began with the premise
that an agency activity which has no "benefit" is arbitrary and capricious, and
thereby prohibited by the Administrative Procedure Act and the fourth
amendment. 19 They then suggested that whenever the cost of compliance to
the corporation, as opposed to the agency, exceeds the benefits derived from
compliance, this activity as well is unreasonable. 6 0 Both the district court and
the court of appeals rejected this argument."'
"5

595 F.2d at 710-11 n.159.

Dole, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus Protectingthe Vulnerable: The FTC's Special Interest
Groups, 9 ANrrrusT L. & EoN. REV. (No. 2) 15, 20 (1977).
156Id. at 21.
'5

157Id. at 16. Neither Commissioner Dole nor her critics went beyond their premises to
demonstrate how these activities in fact were or were not quantifiable.
158FTCA § 5(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (1976): "The Commission is empowered and
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." (Emphasis added.)
159APA § 10(e) (2) (A), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (A) (1976), set out at note 106 supra; U.S. CONST.
amend. IV, set out at note 133 supra.
160See note 144 supra.
11432 F. Supp. at 309; 595 F.2d at 703-04.
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Despite the absence of any express statutory provision obligating the FTC
or any other agency to utilize cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the
costs to it or to the regulatee justify the benefits, the policy question remains as
to whether there should be such a provision. Should there be a presumption
that the agency activity is arbitrary or capricious or unreasonable until the
agency has demonstrated, for example with the use of an "Economic
Impact Study," that the ends justify the means?
The Commission on Federal Paperwork suggested that mandatory costbenefit analysis imposed upon agencies would be impractical:
[T]he Commission found that the traditional benefit/cost approach
to reducing the paperwork burden "while insuring lawful needs for
information" is of limited utility. Information value is largely
subjective and tends to be political in character; burdens on the other
hand are more quantifiable and tend to be objectively measurable
in a simple
and assessed. Values and burdens cannot be put6 together
2
equation that can be "solved" on a computer.1
Although the agency might not be able to apply "traditional" cost-benefit
analysis, it can take steps to maximize value and minimize burden
separately.'63 In its value assessment, the agency should clearly make three
separate determinations: a) what is the relative value of the primary goal, as
established by Congress (e.g., maintenance of fair trade); b) what is the value
of the secondary goal in terms of accomplishing the primary goal (e.g.,
establishing a data bank on market structure); and c) what is the value of the
actual information requested in terms of accomplishing the secondary goal
(i.e., are the requested data meaningful and reliable?). While the court should
not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency, it should remain
cautious until the agency is able to demonstrate deliberate consideration of
the above questions. Instead, it appears that the cursory relevance
examination applied in the LB/CPR litigation was so deferential to the FTC
that the corporations received no meaningful assurances.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The following facts are undeniable. The constitutional separation of
powers requires an element of deference between the branches of the federal
government.16 4 Congress intended independent regulatory agencies to have
broad and independent discretion. 16 5 Congress intended the FTC specifically
to have broad and independent discretion.' However, the courts in the
162Commission on Federal Paperwork, Information Value/Burden Assessment 2 (Sept. 9,
1977).
161Id. See also Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1979, at 12, col. 1, outlining an interesting
alternative introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch to compel each agency to consider value of
information collected by requiring the agency to compensate the regulatees out of its own budget
for costs incurred in information reporting.
161
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,707-08,715 (1974) (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 187, 191-92 (C.C. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.) ).
l65
See discussion of authority of independent regulatory agencies under the Federal Reports
Act at notes 68-96 supra and accompanying text.
166According to a study of the FTC by the American Bar Association: "When Congress
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LB/CPR litigation have immoderately transcended these premises,
engendering the unarticulated conclusion that, within the scope of the FTC's
statutory authority, "fishing expeditions" will be sanctioned.
As corporate conglomerate structures become increasingly vast and
complex, the FTC must have at its disposal broad information-gathering
procedures adequate to meet the challenge. On the other hand, a strong
substantive information-gathering authority must exist in harmony with
procedural safeguards designed to protect the legitimate interests of the
corporate respondents. In the LB/CPR litigation, the court supported strong
information-gathering authority to the detriment of valid procedural
safeguards.
For example, it is indisputable that measures such as the Census "value of
shipments" survey will provide valuable data to the FTC. However, when it is
apparent that the use of such a survey by the FTC will result in damage either
to respondents of confidential Census Bureau inquiries or to the Census
Bureau itself in the exercise of its own information-gathering authority, the
FTC should be limited to two feasible alternatives: a) to solicit such
information with the express assurance that any submission of data similar to
confidential information is strictly voluntary or b) to replace the Census
Bureau "value of shipments" survey with the OMB's SIC system which is
nearly identical and does not threaten a breach of confidentiality or similarly
to design an exclusive FTC manufacturing activity system to replace the
"value of shipments" survey. While these undoubtedly are not the most
convenient alternatives, they could provide the FTC with a reasonable
measure of effectiveness while at the same time preserving the legitimate
confidentiality interests of the corporations and the Census.
The review of the Comptroller provided by the Federal Reports Act
provides only a limited check on the agency against duplication and
burdensomeness imposed on the corporations. Any greater authority on
behalf of the Comptroller would excessively thwart the substantive
information-gathering authority of the FTC.
On the other hand, to the extent that the Comptroller's scrutiny of needless
duplication and burdensomeness is limited, the FTC should be required to
scrutinize itself. Even if the FTC, or any inquiring agency, does not examine
the aggregate cost-burden imposed upon a corporation by the government as
a whole, there should be an examination by the agency of its own aggregate
cost-burden. Cost estimates should not be calculated with the assumption that
the corporation will voluntarily waive any of its legitimate rights or privileges.
The agency should reimburse or share corporate reporting costs.
In any information-gathering program, the FTC, as well as other agencies,
should be able to demonstrate the steps taken to minimize the cost and to
maximize the value of the information gathered. Whenever possible, the
agency should be able to demonstrate the relationship between the
information gathered and the actual accomplishment of the formulated goal.
enacted the FTCA, it was aware of the Supreme Court's prior narrow construction of
investigatory powers contained in the Interstate Commerce Commission Act. To avoid a similar
stifling of FTC investigatory activity, Congress used extremely broad language in defining the
FTC's powers in this area." Report of the ABA Comm'n to Study the FTC 69 (1969) (citations
omitted).
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Trade secrets and confidential information should receive conservative
protection for the benefit of the respondent and of the reputation of the
agency.
While some deference should be given to the agency's own assessment of
the above issues, it is ultimately in the interest of the agency as well as the
corporation for the court to insure that the agency has in fact given serious
consideration to these issues. Such assurance was lacking in the LB/CPR
litigation.
In the face of spiraling government information-gathering activity, the
concept of arbitrary and capricious agency action should embrace the failure
to address thoroughly issues of value, relevance, and burdensomeness. The
agency owes a duty, to the public as well as to respondents, to demonstrate
that it is gathering only appropriate, useful information and that it is making
good use of such information.
DOUGLAS P. WHIPPLE
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